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Washington University 
Journal of Law & Policy  
New Directions in Environmental Law 
Environmental Law: Then And Now 
A. Dan Tarlock  
This symposium originated when the editors of this journal 
approached Professor Mandelker about publishing an environmental 
symposium issue. He graciously consulted me and we decided on a 
yin and yang symposium. We selected five core environmental 
statutes: the Clean Air and Water Acts, the Endangered Species Act, 
the Toxic Substances Control Act, and the National Environmental 
Policy Act. We then paired established scholars with younger 
counterparts. The basic idea was that the senior scholar would look 
back at the assumptions behind the original Acts, examine how the 
assumptions have held up since the environmental decade (1969–
1980) in light of evolving knowledge about the nature of the 
problems and the performance of governance institutions, and assess 
what worked and what did not work about each statute. Junior 
scholars would speculate on what in these statutes will continue to 
work and what reforms are needed to meet the future challenges of 
environmental protection.  
Professor Mandelker and I are deeply grateful to the Washington 
University School of Law for sponsoring an authors seminar on 
March 20, 2009 in St. Louis. All the authors benefitted from the 
conference presentations and exchanges. We are equally grateful to 
 
 
 Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, A.B. (1962), LL.B. 
(1965) Stanford University.  
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the editors of the Journal for their diligent editorial and 
organizational work in bringing this issue to fruition. For Professor 
Mandelker and me, the hardest part of this project was selecting the 
authors. We would have liked to publish a multi-volume symposium 
to reflect the extraordinary depth and breadth of current 
environmental law scholarship. We hope that this snapshot of the 
strengths and weakness of the first generation of environmental 
statutes raises provocative questions about the future of 
environmental law. 
I. INTRODUCTION: THEN AND NOW 
Environmental law is both a mature and constantly evolving field 
of law. While global climate change now dominates environmental 
discourse,
1
 the core regulatory regimes that were enacted between 
1969 and 1980 (the environmental decade) remain important because 
their original objectives have been only partially realized. The 
excellent articles in this volume probe the bases of these core 
statutory schemes and suggest reforms and new ways of 
incorporating global climate change mitigation and adaptation into 
their administration. This Introduction places the articles in the 
historical context of modern environmentalism and environmental 
law by situating the foundation of environmental law in both the 
rational and radical 1960s. To better understand the evolution of the 
law and the challenges we face in adapting environmental law in light 
of what have we have learned since the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
we must first examine the era in which the environment statutes were 
drafted. This Introduction briefly articulates the basic assumptions of 
this era, including the inherent tensions between rational and radical 
environmentalism, illustrates how these tensions influenced the first 
generation of environment law, and, as the articles indicate, continue 
to influence the debates about reforms.  
This is an optimal time to look backward for three primary 
reasons. First, there has been considerable learning in fields such as 
ecology and toxic substance exposure, much of which is barely 
 
 1. Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1295, 1296 (2009) 
(―[C]limate change is the issue in environmental law in the United States . . . .‖). 
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reflected in existing law. Second, global climate change forces us to 
both examine the utility of existing regulatory programs and design 
new ones. For example, why protect endangered species‘ habitat if 
the species can no longer tolerate the area?
2
 Third, after its 
spectacular development in the early 1970s, United States 
environmental law has been virtually static for almost three decades. 
This ―stasis‖ is unsustainable because there is a widespread 
consensus that ―political polarization and a lack of leadership have 
left environmental protection in the United States burdened with 
obsolete statutes and regulatory strategies.‖3 If environmental 
protection is to adapt to the challenges of the twenty-first century, the 
legacy of the environmental decade must be reevaluated and much of 
it rethought. If this legacy goes unexamined, environmental law may 
become the legal equivalent of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: a 
magnificent baroque structure which failed to adapt to changing 
conditions.  
II. THE RATIONAL AND RADICAL OR MYTHIC 1960S 
Modern environmentalism is widely understood as a product of 
the mythic, radical 1960s (1965–1973). However, environmental law 
is a byproduct of both the pre-radical, rational first half of the 1960s 
and the more familiar, radical part.
4
 Both halves of the 1960s 
recognized the radical implications of the scientific and moral 
―imperative‖ environmentalism, but they differed sharply in their 
faith in established governmental institutions to act on these 
imperatives. In the first half of the 1960s, the construct of 
environmental protection replaced the debate over natural resources 
conservation versus preservation,
5
 which had dominated ―pre-
environmental politics‖ in the twentieth century.6  
 
 2. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered Species Act: Building Bridges to 
the No–Analog Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2008).  
 3. Carol A. Casazza Herman, David Schoenbrod, Richard B. Stewart & Katrina M. 
Wyman, Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the New Congress and 
Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1 (2008).  
 4. See, e.g., JOHN C. MCWILLIAMS, THE 1960S CULTURAL REVOLUTION (2000) 
(discussing the varied aspects of the 1960s as a decade).  
 5. This idea is generally associated with the late L.K. Caldwell, whose theories of 
environmental protection as an organizing force for public administration were subsequently 
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The idea of respecting nature first appeared on the political 
agenda during the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt (1901–
1908).
7
 President Roosevelt‘s commitment to the conservation of 
natural resources included both preservation and ownership and 
efficient management exploitation.
8
 Conservation‘s appeal faded 
during the rapacious and corrupt 1920s and had a rebirth in the 1930s 
during the New Deal,
9
 but by the 1950s, it again had lost its 
widespread appeal. However, bitter regional political fights over 
public lands issues such as grazing fees and the damming of scenic 
canyons occasionally attracted national attention. Respect for the 
beauty of nature and the need for scientific management laid the 
foundation for the modern environmental movement. The 
environmental movement primarily absorbed the preservation branch 
of the progressive conservation to ―wall off‖ nature from humans,10 
but it offered a much more holistic and scientific vision of the 
environment compared to the aesthetic and spiritual justifications for 
preservation used in the past. Writing about the rise of 
environmentalism in the 1950s and 1960s, Richard N. L. Andrews 
observed, ―the most revolutionary element of this new public 
consciousness was a powerful new awareness of the environment as a 
living system—a ―web of life‖ or ecosystem—rather than just a 
storehouse of commodities to be extracted or a physical or chemical 
machine to be manipulated.‖11 
Political movements do not arise out of thin air. The 
environmental movement was a product of post-World War II fears 
of public health hazards and the loss of open space around urban 
areas. Among the immediate factors leading to the movement were 
 
written into the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. See RICHARD N. L. ANDREWS, 
MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 223–26 (1999).  
 6. Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall‘s book, The Quiet Crisis, was an important, 
popular synthesis of nascent environmental thinking and a call for a modern conservation ethic. 
See STEWART L. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS (1st ed. 1963). 
 7. See DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE WILDERNESS WARRIOR: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND 
THE CRUSADE FOR AMERICA (2009).  
 8. See id.; see also ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 148–52. 
 9. For a discussion of conservation policies during the New Deal, see generally FDR 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Henry L. Henderson & David B. Woolner eds., 2005).  
 10. See ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 223–26.  
 11. Id. at 202. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/2
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fears about radiation exposure, which had been building since the 
1950s; the linkage of visible pollution (smog) to the internal 
combustion engine; the suspected health and ecosystem damages 
caused by synthetic chemicals such as DDT; and the 1969 Santa 
Barbara oil spill, which suggested that other aesthetic and ecosystem 
disasters caused by inadequately regulated technology would 
increase.
12
 These concerns were also fomented by the country‘s post-
war affluence, which gave the American public a taste for beauty and 
recreation, and the release of social reform energy from the anti-
Vietnam War movement.
13
 
During the Kennedy administration, the need for environmental 
protection emerged as a dialogue among a few cabinet officials, 
legislators and their staffs, and representatives of the old-line 
conservation groups. During the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations (before the latter was consumed by the Vietnam 
War), environmental policy was seen as government‘s response to 
diffuse demands for more open space, a more beautiful landscape, 
less visible pollution, and better control of science and technology.
14
 
The creators of modern environmental policy saw environmental 
protection as an extension of the New Deal state.
15
 The main players 
were to be Congress and reformed ―expert agencies.‖ 
Under the leadership of Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall 
(1960–1968), the Kennedy and Johnson administrations sought to 
adapt the expert New Deal administrative state to address these new 
 
 12. JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON 
CALIFORNIA AND FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE AIR POLLUTION, 1945–1975, at 
263–77 (1977) (discussing the relationship between pollution crises and new pollution control 
legislation).  
 13. Many historians emphasize the post-World War II roots of modern environmentalism 
such as leisure and the dissemination of information about the negative effects of the fruits of 
World War II research, pesticides, and atomic power. See, e.g., ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 
201–02; SAMUEL P. HAYS, BEAUTY, HEALTH AND PERMANENCE: ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1955–1985 (1987). Additionally, the Council on Environmental 
Quality, The Tenth Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality 10 (1979), noted 
that ―the environmental outlook, with its opposition to careless impersonal use of technology in 
a way that destroys life rather than conserving it, had strong spiritual ties with the peace 
movement and the ethical climate of the 1960s.‖  
 14. See ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 222.  
 15. Cf. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 35–38, 132–33 
(2004).  
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mid-twentieth century values. Secretary Udall built on the 
conservationist legacy, although he also recognized that 
environmentalism posed a fundamental paradigm shift. For example, 
he wrote that Rachel Carson‘s book Silent Spring ―spurred new lines 
of thought about resources and the limits of technology that began to 
alter the thinking of my generation.‖16 The architects of 
environmental protection assumed that this objective could still fit 
easily within the dominant liberal view that the problems of 
governance were technical rather than ideological. Initially, 
environmental protection was addressed through new preservation 
legislation such as the Wilderness Act,
17
 the Wild and Scenic Rivers 
Act,
18
 and the imposition of new planning mandates on the existing 
agencies. This thinking culminated in the National Environmental 
Policy Act of 1969.
19
 The detailed statutes and frequent judicial 
challenges to administrative decisions that came in the 1970s, 
however, were not part of the plan.  
The rationalists were caught off guard when environmentalism 
became a mass movement driven by fear of imminent threats to 
public health, the ―destruction‖ of nature, and a general rejection of 
the expert state whose legitimacy had been weakened by the Vietnam 
War. Frustrated with what they perceived as unresponsive, hostile 
government agencies, environmentalists followed the civil rights 
model and turned to the courts for relief from the political system. 
However, lawyers had to create environmental law out of whole 
cloth, as there was no constitutional basis on which to litigate. 
Environmental lawyers followed the great common law tradition left 
open to socially marginal groups and pursued a ―rule of law 
litigation‖ strategy. New Deal expert agencies were reclassified as 
ossified, concrete-pouring mission agencies. To discipline them, 
 
 16. STEWART L. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS AND THE NEXT GENERATION 195 (1988). 
Udall defended Silent Spring in a 1964 Saturday Review of Literature review at a time when the 
chemical industry was spending large amounts of money to discredit the book. Secretary Udall, 
among others, imported Carson‘s basic lessons into the legislative history of NEPA.  
 17. Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577 78 Stat. 890, 890 (1964) (codified at 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1131–1136 (2006)). 
 18. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906, 906 (1968) (codified at 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1271–1287 (2006)). 
 19. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (2006)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/2
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lawyers created the fiction that the recognition of new environmental 
protection duties merely required courts to perform their traditional 
and constitutionally legitimate function of applying and enforcing, 
rather than creating, pre-existing rules. They also convinced courts, 
and ultimately Congress, that environmental enforcement had to be 
shared between the agencies and citizens operating through non-
governmental organizations.
20
  
The litigation ―über alles‖ branch of environmental law can be 
explained as an unplanned byproduct of the unique guerilla politics of 
environmentalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
21
 Environmental 
law was born out of the fight to stop a pump storage project at Storm 
King Mountain on the Hudson River in New York State. The 
successful lawsuit to remand a Federal Power Commission license 
became the paradigmatic environmental lawsuit.
22
 First, an ad hoc 
citizen group gained unprecedented standing to represent non-
economic, aesthetic interests. Second, the plaintiffs convinced the 
court of appeals to read a broad regulatory statute, which at best 
conferred discretion on the agency to consider aesthetic values (a 
then-much contested idea), to impose mandatory duties on an agency 
to consider environmental values, and to justify decisions not to 
protect environmental values more fully.
23
 This remains the core 
―rule of law‖ litigation strategy.24  
This radical strategy was adopted out of necessity in an ad hoc 
fashion because environmental values had almost no support in the 
common law, constitutional law, or legislation. Access to the courts 
was limited because standing was thought to be confined to common 
law or statutory rights or legislatively created non-common law legal 
interests. The statutory regimes that promoted the degradation of the 
landscapes, rivers, and airsheds that NGOs and their lawyers were 
trying to mitigate all were enacted before environmental values were 
widely understood, and these statutes conferred almost unlimited 
 
 20. I have developed this idea at greater length in A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of 
Environmental “Rule of Law” Litigation, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 575 (2002). 
 21. Id. at 582. 
 22. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. 
denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).  
 23. Tarlock, supra note 20, at 582–83. 
 24. Id. at 583. 
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discretion on administrative agencies to choose among resource use 
options ranging from complete preservation to full development. 
Although in the late 1960s the prospect of comprehensive political 
action seemed remote, this quickly changed. In the early 1970s, 
environmental law gained statutory status.
25
 However, the ―rule of 
law‖ litigation strategy and the growing distrust of all forms of 
expertise were carried over into NEPA litigation and the 
implementation of all of the subsequently enacted pollution control 
and biodiversity conservation statutes. Thus, environmental law is an 
unstable mix of New Deal faith in the expert state and post-New Deal 
distrust of that state. Ultimately, the rule-of-law strategy transferred 
power from the mission agencies to the courts, dethroned engineers 
from their seats of power and created powerful environmental NGOs 
which now have a seat at the political table. However, both the 
rational and guerilla wings of environmental law shared certain 
common assumptions. The question is which of these assumptions 
and the law that they produced have been undermined in whole or in 
part, and which remain relevant. 
III. THE ASSUMED SIMPLICITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION  
Modern environmental law rests on at least six key assumptions 
and several subsidiary ones. Five were products of the rational sixties 
and the sixth is a byproduct of the effort to ban DDT, the first major 
use of guerilla litigation. The overarching assumption in the early 
days of environmental law was that it would be relatively simple to 
develop the necessary policies to address the perceived problems of 
environmental degradation, which included visible pollution, cancer 
risk and aesthetic blight. The emphasis is on relatively because as 
Robert L. Glicksman and Matthew R. Batzel demonstrate in Science, 
Politics, Law, and the Arc of the Clean Water Act: The Role of 
Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Control Landmark, the 
architects of the foundational programs were very knowledgeable 
about environmental problems and their complexity but still had a 
naive faith in the ability of rationality to solve them.
26
 In the ensuing 
 
 25. See ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 227–29.  
 26. For example, Robert L. Glicksman & Matthew R. Batzel, Science, Politics, Law, and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/2
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four decades, this assumption has been severely eroded because our 
understanding of the complexity of ―managing‖ the environment has 
deepened. For example, since the 1960s, there have been major 
advances in our understanding of the links between pollution, 
individual genetic makeup and illness, and the dynamic behavior of 
ecosystems. There are vexing economic and moral problems that 
challenge the idea that environmental protection is simply a technical 
problem. We are still debating whether environmentalism is naive 
romanticism, science-driven rationalism, or a secular religion. 
Finally, we have picked most of the low-hanging fruit of pollution 
and risk reduction and now must make harder judgments about the 
value of incremental further reductions in an ―environment‖ where 
increases in knowledge yield more scientific, economic, and ethical 
questions than answers. The original vision of environmental 
protection remains embedded in this political and intellectual 
landscape, although the political moment that produced it has passed. 
A. Ecosystem Preservation Is Transcendent, Value-Neutral, and Easy 
to Accomplish 
The first crucial assumption underlying modern environmental 
law was that ecosystem protection was a transcendent, value-neutral, 
unifying public policy objective; the force of the idea was assumed to 
be self-evident to any rational person and capable of implementation 
throughout the government.
27
 Once Congress mandated a consistent, 
 
the Arc of the Clean Water Act: The Role of Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Control 
Landmark, 32 WASH. U. J.L & POL‘Y 99, 104-08 (2010), show that the architects of the Clean 
Water Act were aware that the ―no discharge by 1985‖ goal was not achievable but thought that 
a mandated mis-course study by the National Academies of Sciences and Engineering would 
provide the necessary scientific and technical information to chart the next step toward actually 
achieving the goal.  
 27. During the July 17, 1968, pioneering and almost unprecedented Joint House-Senate 
Colloquium to Discuss a National Policy for the Environment, Secretary Udall stated as his first 
principle for a national environmental policy: ―We must begin to work with, not against, the 
laws of the planet on which we live, rejecting once and for all the false notion that man can 
impose his will on nature. This requires that we begin to obey the dictates of ecology, giving 
this master science a new and central place in the Federal scientific establishment.‖ Hearing 
Before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs United States Senate and Committee on 
Science and Astronautics United States House of Representative, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 17 
(1968).  
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comprehensive protection strategy through the entire federal 
bureaucracy, agencies would fall into line with the help of vigilant 
congressional oversight. This was the core belief of the late L.K. 
Caldwell, the ―father of NEPA.‖28 Caldwell was a prominent public 
administration scholar; he was well aware of the barriers to the 
implementation of his idea, but he assumed that the overarching idea 
of ecosystem protection would become the governing principle for 
much of the federal bureaucracy. His meshed nicely with Aldo 
Leopold
29
 and Rachel Carson‘s30 widely read pleas to respect nature 
by walling her off from the maximum amount of human intervention. 
For example, Secretary Udall credited Rachel Carson‘s concepts with 
―inspir[ing] . . . the enactment of [the] National Environmental Policy 
Act,‖31 although her ideas are not explicitly articulated either in the 
Act‘s text or legislative history. 
The modern environmental movement inherited the early 
twentieth century preservation movement‘s idea that sacred and 
spectacular nature should not be disturbed by human intervention, but 
it quickly moved away from this soft idea in favor of a hard scientific 
justification for environmental protection. This idea was reflected, for 
example, in pre-environmental decade legislation such as the 
Wilderness Act of 1964
32
 and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.
33
 
Modern environmentalism soon moved from the spiritual and 
aesthetic to the scientific by making the relatively new idea of the 
inherently stable ecosystem rather than sacred space the focus of 
protection.
34
 
 
 28. See ANDREWS, supra note 5, at 223–26. 
 29. ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 
(1949). The book was written in 1947 and published after Leopold‘s death from a heart attack 
in 1948. See MARYBETH LORBIECKI, ALDO LEOPOLD: A FIERCE GREEN FIRE 168–81 (1996); 
CURT MEINE, ALDO LEOPOLD: HIS LIFE AND WORK 504–25 (1948).  
 30. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). 
 31. UDALL, supra note 16, at 203. 
 32. The Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2006) defines a wilderness as 
an area ―where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man.‖ 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1131(c). 
 33. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (1968) (codified at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1271–1287 (2006)). 
 34. See Michael J. McCloskey, Changing Views of What the Wilderness System Is All 
About, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 369 (1999), for a discussion of the differences between the 
―natural‖ and ecological views of the purposes of the national wilderness system.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/2
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In the 1960s, the prevailing view of ecosystems was that they 
would eventually reach stasis or stability.
35
 Glicksman and Batzel 
remind us that the dynamic nature of ecosystems was recognized, but 
ecologists and their followers still assumed that ecosystems passed 
through several stages before reaching the final, stable climax.
36
 
Environmental lawyers and administrators believed that equilibrium 
ecology, as stated in Eugene Odum‘s classic text,37 provided the 
scientific basis to put Aldo Leopold‘s famous dictum ―let nature be‖ 
into practice. Ecology allowed lawyers to argue that courts and 
agencies should adopt nature's rules as legal rules.
38
 Ironically, 
environmental lawyers eagerly embraced equilibrium ecology just as 
this static view of nature was being replaced by more dynamic ones. 
Today, the equilibrium paradigm has been almost totally rejected in 
ecology—a trend which goes back to the 1930s—and replaced with a 
complex, stochastic non-equilibrium one.
39
  
In his pathbreaking book, Discordant Harmonies, Professor 
Daniel Botkin ―deconstructed‖ the equilibrium paradigm as a 
misguided effort to match science to theological and enlightenment 
scientific visions of a perfect universe or perfectly functioning 
machine.
40
 Botkin‘s basic argument is that the images of nature that 
have influenced ecology are static when in fact the kinds of resource 
use problems society faces require a dynamic view of nature, one 
which starts from the premises that human action is one of the 
principal forces operating on ecosystems and that system 
disturbances are both predictable and random.
41
 Ecosystems are 
patches or collections of conditions that exist for finite periods of 
time.
42
 The accelerating interaction between humans and the natural 
 
 35. Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 26, at 110 (arguing that Congress was aware that 
ecosystems were dynamic but assumed ―that the time scale in which the CWA would operate 
would reflect ‗a relatively high degree of stability‘‖ in the absence of human intervention). 
 36. Id. at 109–10. 
 37. Odum explained and summarized his basic theory in EUGENE P. ODUM, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF ECOLOGY 44–46 (2d ed. 1959).  
 38. See WILLIAM HOLLAND DRURY, JR., Chance and Change: Ecology for 
Conservationists 184–85 (John G.T. Anderson ed., 1998). 
 39. Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 35, at 108–09.  
 40. DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY (1990).  
 41. Id. at 12–13. 
 42. Id. at 7–8. 
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environment makes it impossible to return to an ideal state of nature: 
―nature moves and changes and involves risks and uncertainties and 
. . . our judgments of our own actions must be made against this 
moving image.‖43  
The new ecology is challenging and less comforting than the old 
one for at least three reasons. First, the idea of ―pure‖ nature as a 
place apart from humans will not hold up in the future against the 
conservation tradition that began in the late nineteenth century. From 
a biodiversity conservation perspective, nature is more important for 
the services it provides than it is for just existing. The second 
challenge for future ecosystem management will be to restore 
degraded areas and to create the functional equivalent of ―natural‖ 
systems.
44
 Many environmentalists resist the ideas of restoration and 
creation because they believe there is a firm distinction between real 
and artificial nature and that is unethical for humans to attempt to 
create nature.
45
 However, this unrealistic vision of the landscape in 
which we live has no future. The third challenge is that ecosystem 
management requires ad hoc, contingent solutions rather than 
uniform, fixed ones. In short, management is a series of experiments 
without a control group. 
Professor Holly Doremus‘s article, The Endangered Species Act: 
Static Law Meets Dynamic World, traces the history of the 
Endangered Species Act (―ESA‖) to illustrate the need to correct the 
assumption that nature is simple to manage.
46
 For all its flaws, the 
ESA remains the nation‘s primary biodiversity conservation act, 
 
 43. Id. at 190.  
 44. See, e.g., Fred Bosselman, Swamp Swaps: The “Second Nature” of Wetlands, 39 
ENVTL. L. 577 (2009). In the course of an analysis of both the destruction of wetlands to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions and their possible use as carbon sinks, the noted environmental and 
land use scholar asks, if a plant capable of reducing methane emissions were created and used 
to replace wetlands ―and the replacement had only minimal adverse impact on other wetland 
functions, why wouldn‘t it qualify as providing beneficial services?‖ Id. at 621.  
 45. The leading proponent of this idea is Eric Katz. See ERIC KATZ, NATURE AS SUBJECT: 
HUMAN OBLIGATION AND NATURAL COMMUNITY (1997); Eric Katz, The Problem of 
Ecological Restoration, 18 ENVTL. ETHICS 222 (1996). The argument that the distinction is 
supportable is effectively refuted in Yeuk-Sze Lo, Natural and Artifactual: Restored Nature As 
Subject, 21 ENVTL. ETHICS 247 (1999); see also ROBERT ELLIOT, FAKING NATURE: THE 
ETHICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION (1997).  
 46. Holly Doremus, The Endangered Species Act: Static Law Meets Dynamic World, 32 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 175 (2010).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/2
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although the construct had not been ―invented‖ in 1973 when 
Congress enacted ―one of the last pieces of environmental 
bandwagon legislation.‖47 Yet, it is difficult to adapt to the broader 
objective of biodiversity conservation, in part because the ESA rests 
on a static view of species and the landscapes and watercourses in 
which they live.
48
 In the future, especially as we deal with global 
climate change‘s impacts on biodiversity,49 evolutionary theory and 
adaptive management must be incorporated into the Act, even as old 
certainties like the definition of species become muddied.
50
  
Professor Jamison E. Colburn carries this theme forward in his 
article, Qualitative, Quantitative, and Integrative Conservation, 
which illustrates the barriers to carrying biodiversity conservation 
into the twenty-first century.
51
 His probing article demonstrates the 
truth of the first book of Genesis, that new knowledge can be a mixed 
blessing. Using as examples the critical habitat designation for the 
Canadian Lynx and the listing of the Polar Bear as a threatened 
species, Professor Colburn argues that we lack the institutional 
capacity to apply scientific advances when making conservation 
decisions. The tragedy of modern biology is that the more risk 
information we have (and are required to try and assemble), ―the less 
certain we are that we can ever know which biological entities merit 
our protection.‖52 
Professor Colburn‘s article identifies three tensions that impede 
current efforts to protected threatened and endangered species.
53
 
First, biodiversity conservation is becoming just another risk 
management problem which requires dynamic decision-making under 
varying conditions of uncertainty; put differently, it is an example of 
the theoretical convergence now taking place in environmental law. 
Biodiversity conservation is moving toward the toxics regulation 
 
 47. STEVEN L. YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 48 (1982), quoted in Doremus, supra note 10, at 177.  
 48. See Doremus, supra note 46, at 202-03. 
 49. These impacts are discussed in COMMITTEE ON ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE, NAT‘L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2008).  
 50. See Doremus, supra note 46, at 183–202. 
 51. Jamison E. Colburn, Qualitative, Quantitative, and Integrative Conservation, 32 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 237 (2010).  
 52. Id. at 266.  
 53. See infra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
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model with, as Professor Adelman‘s article in this symposium so well 
enumerates, all the problems of this project.
54
 Second, post-Chevron 
administrative law often subjects agency decisions to unpredictable 
judicial review; and third, we are seriously under-investing in 
biodiversity conservation, which results in internal regulatory 
gridlock. ―The ESA saddles the Services with far too many 
conjunctive tasks today, inviting their opponents to disrupt, delay, 
and defeat them.‖55 To correct this situation, Professor Colburn 
proposes what amounts to a ―regulatory science‖ solution. Ultimately 
the ocean of available data must be shaped and adapted to the 
cognitive capacity of the users to provide managerial benchmarks to 
evaluate, inter alia, habitat designation; human, biological, and 
chemical interactions of the ―whole ‗earth system;‘‖ and the 
―evolutionary processes of speciation.‖56  
B. Science Has the Answers 
The rational 1960s were a time of great faith in the capacity for 
human progress through science and technology. The ecosystem 
stability hypothesis reflects the broader, progressive assumption that 
science could tell us both why and how we should act to preserve the 
environment as we progressed as a wealthy and powerful democracy. 
In retrospect, the 1960s were the twilight of the progressive vision 
that science and rationality applied by a strong regulatory state could 
produce a ―good society.‖ The complexity of environmental 
problems has forced the environmental movement to abandon the 
idea that science will produce only ―the‖ right answer,57 but of 
necessity we cling to the idea that rationality demands science-based 
decisions even as we recognize that science has been ―deconstructed‖ 
and lost its legitimacy as an unfailing source of truth and 
enlightenment.
58
 Therefore, modern environmental law exists in a 
 
 54. See David E. Adelman, A Cautiously Pessimistic Appraisal of Trends in Toxics 
Regulation, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 377 (2010). 
 55. Colburn, supra note 51, at 282 (emphasis added).  
 56. See id. at 289.  
 57. Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1613 (1995) is a seminal exploration of the limits of science in environmental regulation. 
 58. See, e.g., SHEILA JASNOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICY 
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twilight zone. We accept that science is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for a legitimate decision.
59
 At the same time, we reject the 
false dichotomy between good and bad or junk science, which has 
dominated environmental debates about toxic substances regulation 
since the EPA began to ban the use of certain pesticides, and has now 
spread its cancer to all science-based environmental issues.
60
 For 
example, environmentalists reject the narrow definition of science 
that the Supreme Court articulated in Daubert,
61
 which is the legal 
basis of challenges to the science behind many regulations.  
The current view of legitimate science is more nuanced than the 
original one. We have relaxed the indices long associated with 
―proven‖ science. We accept that credible science need not 
necessarily be peer reviewed and reflect a high level of consensuses 
within the scientific community, because the choice is often 
regulation in the face of uncertainty or no regulation of potentially 
dangerous substances or activities. Thus, decision-makers can make 
decisions that represent prudent extensions of the existing state of 
knowledge for a variety of reasons. However, to control the use of 
science, lawyers have pulled the familiar procedural trick: the more 
that decision departs from the consensus within the scientific 
community and the greater the information gaps, the higher the 
burden of justification.
62
  
C. Technology Has the Rest of the Answers 
In the 1960s, science and technology were conjoined; they were 
the twin engineers of social and material progress. Just as ecologists 
would tell us how to protect nature from destabilizing activities such 
as dams, roads, and power lines, engineers would tell us to control 
visible, nasty pollution. The Clean Air and Water Acts‘ model of 
central command and control regulation rested on the assumption that 
 
MAKERS (1990).  
 59. See Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Science, Judgment, and Controversy in 
Natural Resources Regulation, 26 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1 (2005), for a fuller 
discussion of the proper role of science in environmental regulation. 
 60. Id. at 17–18.  
 61. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590, 593–97 (1993).  
 62. See discussion infra Part III.F. 
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engineers could specify the technology necessary to meet health-
based emission standards.
63
 The high point of technological optimism 
led to the idea that technology could be forced on laggard industries 
and cities with minimal sewage treatment facilities.
64
  
Many of the articles in this symposium remind us that technology 
remains central to the project of environmental protection,
65
 but that 
it is much harder to implement today for five primary reasons. First, 
NEPA litigation helped undermine society‘s faith in large-scale 
public works. Second, the discovery of orphaned and operating 
hazardous waste facilities dealt a serious blow to the credibility of 
engineers who claimed they could build ―safe‖ disposal facilities. 
Facilities represented as state of the art and safe leaked. Third, many 
problems required both technology and management; but 
management, which often meant changes in land use practices and 
personal choice, proved too controversial and was opposed by 
powerful lobbies.
66
 Automobile exhaust emissions have been cut by 
ninety percent, but we have been unable to deal with the problem of 
increased automobile use or runoff from agricultural waste, pesticide, 
and fertilizer applications. Fourth, at the beginning of the 
environmental movement, polluters were the ―other.‖ Industry and 
cities were the villains and strong government action was necessary 
to modify their behavior. There was little role for the individual as 
the few deep ecologists who preached reduced consumption were 
marginalized, but the problem of ―directing‖ individual choice has 
emerged as a key problem in addressing global climate change. 
 
 63. See JASANOFF, supra note 58, at 102–06. 
 64. See Robert W. Adler, Resilience, Restoration, and Sustainability: Revisiting the 
Fundamental Principles of the Clean Water Act, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 139 (2010); 
Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 26, at 131–32.  
 65. See Adler, supra note 64; Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 26. The Clean Air Act 
relies on technology, but as Professor Buzbee notes, it relies on State Implementation Plans, 
which offer a wider range of technology and non-technology options than does the Clean Water 
Act. William W. Buzbee, Clean Air Act Dynamism and Disappointments: Lessons for Climate 
Legislation to Prompt Innovation and Discourage Inertia, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 33 
(2010). For example, new sources of emission in nonattainment areas must locate offsets, which 
can come from ways other the installation of new controls on existing emitters. Id. at 50. 
 66. See, e.g., Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 26, at 133 (noting that Congress recognized 
that technological standards alone could not address non-point source water pollution but could 
not overcome opposition of agricultural lobbyists to a strong management program). 
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The story of the Clean Water Act illustrates the fifth reason—the 
need to supplement technology mandates with workable ecosystem 
resilience standards. Both Glicksman and Batzel and Adler agree that 
technological mandates account for the success of the Clean Water 
Act.
67
 They also agree on the failings, the persistence of non-point 
pollution, the incomplete protection of wetlands,
68
 and the uneven 
engagement of states in areas such as TMDL regulation or even 
routine enforcement.
69
 Looking into the future, Professor Adler 
argues that we must keep the framework of the Act but adapt it more 
to the conservation and restoration of aquatic ecosystems.
70
 For 
example, he proposes that the goal of restoring and maintaining the 
―chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation‘s waters‖ 
needs to be reframed as ecological resilience.
71
 This would be a 
substantial change over the original Act, because the goal would not 
be a numerical end state for specific water bodies but rather a moving 
target, a process and set of indices ―to ensure that the system has 
sufficient capacity to respond to environmental perturbations or 
disturbances while still retaining its basic ecological structure and 
functions.‖72 Existing water quality standards only partially address 
this objective, although various EPA and stakeholder efforts have 
tried to expand the reach of the Act by focusing on watershed 
restoration.
73
  
To provide a firmer legal framework, Professor Adler proposes 
amending the water quality standards provisions of the Act ―to clarify 
that specific remedial measures must be undertaken to redress all 
violations of water quality standards, whether numeric and pollutant-
specific or biologically and ecologically based.‖74 In addition, he 
argues that the jurisdictional reach of the Act should be expanded 
from navigable waters, which the Supreme Court has narrowed as 
 
 67. See Adler, supra note 64, at 172; Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 26, at 131. 
 68. Adler, supra note 64, at 169–72; Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 26, at 133–34.  
 69. See Adler, supra note 64, at 155–56; Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 26, at 134–37; 
see also Charles Duhigg, Clean Water Laws Neglected, At a Cost, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, 
at A1.  
 70. Adler, supra note 64, at 166. 
 71. Id. at 149. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 154–55. 
 74. Id. at 155–56.  
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part of its ecologically insensitive Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
75
 
to ―sustainable waters,‖ since ―[w]ater is fundamental to national 
economic sustainability in ways that extend far beyond the concept of 
navigability.‖76 
D. Rational Planning Would Manage Heritage Resources Such as 
Water and the Public Lands and Green the Public Works 
Bureaucracies 
The two related fundamental characteristics of the New Deal state 
are expertise and faith in hyper-rational decision and planning 
processes.
77
 The architects of the modern administrative state sought 
regulatory mechanisms that would allow the application of state 
power informed by state of the art expertise to changing economic, 
social, and scientific conditions.
78
 This enlightened expertise would 
be combined with comprehensive resource planning. Rational 
resource planning had its roots in the Conservation Era vision of 
comprehensive river basin management.
79
 New Deal planning efforts 
never achieved their promise due to intense political opposition,
80
 but 
faith in expert planning to manage natural resources lived on and 
formed the basis of environmental-era legislation such as the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
81
 the Forest and 
Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974,
82
 and the 
Coastal Zone Management Act.
83
  
These acts triggered a great deal of analysis and planning, but 
expert rational planning never achieved legitimacy or a dominant role 
in resource allocation.
84
 Old line resource agencies, such as the Corps 
 
 75. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).  
 76. Adler, supra note 64, at 164.  
 77. Cf. ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION 
AND WAR 37–39 (1995); MARION CLAWSON, NEW DEAL PLANNING 92–94 (1981).  
 78. See BRINKLEY, supra note 77, at 37–38, 46.  
 79. See CLAWSON, supra note 77, at 117–19.  
 80. See generally BRINKLEY, supra note 77; CLAWSON, supra note 77.  
 81. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) 
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4375 (2006))  
 82. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600–1614 (2006).  
 83. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2006).  
 84. The Supreme Court‘s general hostility or indifference to environmental regulation has 
also contributed to the ineffectiveness of planning. For example, in Norton v. S. Utah 
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of Engineers, continued to place great faith in improved rational 
planning, but planning was often reduced to a formal exercise 
unconnected to the achievement of the underlying social objective, 
and seldom was conducted at the relevant geographic scale. In many 
ways, guerilla environmentalism worked against planning.  
The environmental era helped erode the New Deal tradition of 
deference to administrative expertise, which in turn made planning a 
prelude to litigation. The various social revolutions of the 1960s and 
early 1970s coincided with the rise of the deeply pessimistic 
doctrines of law and economics and public choice theory,
85
 which 
rejected the idea of an objective and higher public interest.
86
 This 
pessimism about the ability of government to act to improve the 
human condition, seemingly bourne out by the failures of President 
Johnson‘s War on Poverty, helped undermine the New Deal faith in 
administrative expertise to articulate the public interest. In Clean Air 
Act Dynamism and Disappointments: Lessons for Climate Change 
Legislation to Prompt Innovation and Discourage Inertia,
87
 Professor 
Buzbee draws on his recent scholarship
88
 to illustrate how public 
choice theory can produce a regulatory regime ―encrusted with 
complexities and quirks‖ that is systematically biased in favor of 
older industries, and how this can ―discourage new market 
entrants.‖89  
The legal basis for turning this pessimism or at least skepticism 
into law is the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.
90
 The 
Administrative Procedure Act turned out to be an excellent vehicle to 
 
Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55 (2004), the Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act 
can only be used to compel an agency to undertake a discrete required action. Id. at 64. Thus, 
the decision makes it possible to challenge federal land management agency plans before they 
are concretely applied.   
 85. The foundational works in public choice theory are ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC 
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957) and JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE 
CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).  
 86. See generally DOWNS, supra note 85. 
 87. Buzbee, supra note 65. 
 88. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation and Interaction’s Promise: 
Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145 
(2007).  
 89. Buzbee, supra note 65, at 38.  
 90. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 238 (1946) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (2006)). 
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attack administrative decisions for environmental NGOs as well as 
for the regulated community, which was quick to learn from guerilla 
environmental litigation. After a decade-long debate about the proper 
role of judicial control of administrative action, the Administrative 
Procedure Act imposed a number of due process controls on 
administration actions.
91
 As a result, agencies are now simultaneously 
constrained by both the ―public,‖ which has been given a voice to 
counter the narrow exercise of administrative expertise, and the 
courts.
92
 Public participation in agency decision-making, increased 
access to judicial review, and a hard look at agency decisions are the 
hallmarks of modern administrative law.
93
  
In an attempt to break the gridlock that resulted from 
environmental NGO and industry challenges to regulation, in the 
1990s, a new theory of environmental protection emerged; in place of 
command and control regulation, this theory emphasized place-based 
problem solving through collaboration and consensus.
94
 The merits of 
this approach are open to serious debate, but the theory, which was 
never fully integrated in first generation environmental law, is a 
logical extension of the disintegration of the New Deal state that 
began in the 1960s. In the ―post-New Deal state,‖ the regulated 
community is still the central participant in administrative decision-
making, but new interests or ―stakeholders‖ beyond those with a 
direct economic benefit in the agency‘s actions are increasingly 
included in the multiparty bargaining processes.
95
 Federal agencies, 
such as the Corps and even the EPA, are portrayed as only one of 
many powerful participants in resource management and standard-
setting disputes. Many hail this as a welcome adaptation of 
democratic and public values to the ―de-centered‖ state, but the 
question of whether the ―contracting‖ state is consistent with public 
 
 91. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act 
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1680–81 (1996). 
 92. Cf. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. 
L. REV. 1667, 1760–62 (1975).  
 93. Cf. JASANOFF, supra note 58, at 52–60. 
 94. This theory is clearly articulated in Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular 
Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 876–96 (2005).  
 95. See, e.g., Freeman & Farber, supra note 94. 
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or rule of law values and will deliver the benefits that ―clunky‖ first 
generation environmental laws delivered has not been resolved.
96
  
The implementation of NEPA is an example of both the failure of 
1960s rationality to achieve its objectives, and the hope that the 
process still holds. Professor Daniel R. Mandelker has been a student 
of NEPA since its passage and is a strong proponent of the ability of 
NEPA litigation to promote better environmental decision-making; 
but, as are all students of NEPA, he is accurately aware of its 
weaknesses. His paper applies his extraordinary knowledge of 
planning and NEPA law to tell the story of NEPA‘s fate.97 As 
envisioned by its principal architects, Senator Henry Jackson and 
Indiana University, Bloomington, Professor L. K. Caldwell, NEPA 
was designed to accomplish two objectives, neither of which required 
judicial intervention. As agencies reviewed the environmental 
impacts of their actions through the lens of ecology, the 
Enlightenment dream of progress through science would have us 
believe, agencies would internalize the lessons of science and do the 
right thing.
98
 If they were legally constrained from so doing, they 
would disclose this problem to Congress and the necessary legal 
authority would follow.
99
 Instead, agencies did not take NEPA 
seriously and judicial challenges to environmental impact statements 
became the legal weapon of choice by those challenging a wide range 
of federal actions.
100
 Agencies did learn—how to blunt the impact of 
NEPA.
101
 
After a series of federal circuit court opinions expanding the Act‘s 
scope, the Supreme Court limited it to a disclosure statute and 
drastically limited its scope, especially for the very comprehensive 
 
 96. Collaborative governance used to be called agency capture. Under the influence of law 
and economics, the ―captured‖ theory of agencies has now been discredited. However, students 
of earlier, failed collaborative western resource management experiments such as the Taylor 
Grazing Act are not excited about the new wave of stakeholder governance. See, e.g., George C. 
Coggins, Regulating Federal Natural Resources: A Summary Case against Devolved 
Collaboration, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 602 (1999).  
 97. Daniel R. Mandelker, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Review of Its 
Experience and Problems, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 293 (2010).  
 98. See Mandelker, supra note 97, at 297. 
 99. Cf. William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA’s Insatiable Optimism, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10618, 
10618 (2009). 
 100. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 340 (2004). 
 101. See Mandelker, supra note 97, at 298. 
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agency plans and programs for which the statute was designed.
102
 
Agencies learned to prepare adequate impact statements and to take 
minimal mitigation measures through FONSIs, a technique which, as 
Professor Mandelker points out, was authorized neither in the statute 
nor in the Council of Environmental Quality‘s NEPA regulations.103 
Congress first exempted specific EISs and in the past decade has 
created more general exemptions. Ted Boling‘s article, Making the 
Connection: NEPA Processes for National Environmental Policy, 
provides valuable empirical evidence of this trend by showing that 
agency decisions often result in Environmental Assessments, 
Mitigated Findings of No Significant Impact, and Categorical 
Exemptions.
104
 This is especially true for projects under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
105
 NEPA primarily constrains 
agencies that remain vulnerable to litigation. Nonetheless, as 
Professor Mandelker concludes, ―NEPA is a major environmental 
statute that has contributed its weight to the protection of the 
environment,‖106 but ways must be found to remove the encrusted 
limitations that have prevented it from fundamentally changing 
agency behavior.
107
 To achieve this, Boling recommends that 
agencies stop preparing for litigation and instead take the risk of 
making decisions that may be litigated.
108
 If the environmental 
consequences of a decision are known by decision makers and 
communicated to the public, ―courts must ultimately defer to a well-
designed agency environmental program.‖109 
 
 102. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390; see also Mandelker, supra note 97, at 302. 
 103. Mandelker, supra note 97, at 295, 298.  
 104. Ted Boling, Making the Connection: NEPA Processes for National Environmental 
Policy, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 313, 321 (2010) (noting that there are 1000 EAs compared to 
forty-five full EISs for current projects that lack an existing NEPA analysis).  
 105. Id. at 321–22. 
 106. Mandelker, supra note 97, at 312.  
 107. Hope that NEPA can fulfill its original promise remains strong. See, e.g., Symposium, 
NEPA at 40: How a Visionary Statute Confronts 21st Century Impacts, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 
NEWS & ANALYSIS 10615 (2009). 
 108. Boling, supra note 104, at 329.  
 109. Id. at 330.  
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E. Federalism: An Inconvenient Constitutional Barrier 
From the 1930s to the 1960s, those concerned about air and water 
pollution sought to federalize regulation. This idea triumphed in the 
late 1960s, a time when the central New Deal state was very much 
alive. President Lyndon Johnson‘s Great Society (1964–1966) was 
seen as the perfection of the New Deal state that had been put on hold 
during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.
110
 Even as 
environmentalists were busy attacking the captured mission agencies, 
they accepted the premise that important national policy had to be 
made at the federal level and imposed on the unwilling states. With a 
few exceptions, in the 1960s states had very limited environmental 
protection programs and laws. More importantly, the assumption was 
that states would, as had the southern states with anti-union laws, 
compete for industry by offering low pollution standards. As a sop to 
proponents of Brandeisian federalism, the idea of cooperative 
federalism, which developed during the New Deal, was adopted for 
environmental programs. Cooperative federalism rested on two ideas: 
first, the federal government would set floors, which the states could 
raise but not lower; second, the states would be responsible for 
administering the major regulatory programs, primarily the Clean Air 
and Water Acts, ―incentivized‖ by federal grants and fiscal sanctions 
for non-enforcement.
111
  
Much has changed since the 1960s. Beginning in the 1970s, the 
federal government has progressively shrunk in power. The Reagan 
and Bush I and II administrations sought to divest the federal 
government of many of its regulatory functions. A more conservative 
Supreme Court began to flirt with long dormant dual federalism to 
curb federal powers both as a matter of the true meaning of the 
Commerce Clause and as a canon of statutory construction.
112
 The 
Court also developed a rigid, formal federalism unconnected to the 
 
 110. DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 210–50 
(1986).  
 111. For a clear analysis of cooperative federalism in the context of the Clean Air Act, see 
Douglas R. Williams, Cooperative Federalism and the Clean Air Act: A Defense of Minimum 
Federal Standards, 20 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 67 (2001).  
 112. See Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 35, at 127–29, for an analysis of the Court‘s 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and its effects on environmental legislation. 
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way that all levels of government often interact in environmental 
decisions. For this and other reasons, environmental cases that reach 
the Supreme Court tend to be decided in favor of opponents of 
environmental protection. 
Nature abhors a vacuum, and the states, once seen as an 
unfortunate legacy of an out-of-date Constitution, have begun to 
fulfill Justice Brandeis‘s hope that they would be laboratories of 
progressive experimentation.
113
 The inability and unwillingness of 
both the Clinton and Bush II administrations to address global 
climate change has triggered a rich laboratory of experimentation. 
The rise of state initiatives, especially in the larger states, ultimately 
came to be seen as threat to economic growth and national security, 
and Congress and the Bush II administration began to press for 
ceiling preemption
114—an idea that was unthinkable in the 1960s.  
The two articles in this symposium that focus on the Clean Air 
Act illustrate the legacy of cooperative federalism and the promise of 
progressive state experimentation. Professor Buzbee‘s article, Clean 
Air Act Dynaminism and Disappointments: Lessons for Climate 
Change Legislation to Prompt Innovation and Discourage Inertia, 
demonstrates that cooperative federalism is embedded in the Clean 
Air Act to a greater extent than in other environmental statutes.
115
 
The result has been a mixed blessing. A few states have used it to go 
beyond federal floors, but in other states, it has enabled industry and 
state officials to cooperate ―to take lax enforcement actions in an 
effort to subvert federal or citizen enforcement actions against a 
polluter violating the law.‖116  
Professor Osofsky‘s article, The Future of Environmental Law 
and Complexities of Scale: Federalism Experiments with Climate 
Change under the Clean Air Act, examines how the cooperative 
federalism legacy will impact federal efforts to regulate automobile 
 
 113. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(―It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its 
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the country.‖). 
 114. William W. Buzbee, Asymetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling 
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007).  
 115. Buzbee, supra note 65, at 43–48. 
 116. Id. at 42.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Introduction 25 
 
 
greenhouse gas emissions.
117
 Professor Osofsky applies a four-factor 
vector analysis, which includes geographic scale, vertical and 
horizontal jurisdictions, top-versus bottom-down regulation and 
cooperation versus conflict, and in the regulation of greenhouse gas 
motor vehicle emissions; she finds that all present at different 
moments in time, as the original structure of cooperative federalism 
is inadequate to deal with the problem.
118
 To improve regulation, 
Professor Osofsky recommends that we accept small-scale scientific 
uncertainty as well as a full range of legal, economic, and cultural 
responses.
119
  
Her analysis is an important modification of the original 
assumption that a strong central government was necessary for 
effective environmental protection as well as two subsidiary 
assumptions that have proven wrong. The first was that 
environmental protection would be a conversation between Congress 
and the agencies, in short a conversation among experts. Courts were 
not part of the original vision of NEPA, for example. The opposite 
occurred, and environmental law became a court-agency conversation 
mediated by third parties. The second was that environmental 
protection was a problem of curbing ―the other‖—large industries, 
cities, and the concrete-loving mission agencies. There was little 
room for any assumption of individual responsibility or action. Deep 
ecology was initially dismissed as a fringe utopian idea, but this is 
less and less the case. A wide range of public and private actors must 
be enlisted in the environmental protection project, but Professor 
Osofsky‘s article argues that the best we can hope for is a partial 
diagonal federalism, which engages a subset of all relevant actors 
simultaneously in the regulatory regime ―to construct a range of 
regulatory interactions that can complement one another.‖120  
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F. Public Health Protection Requires Extreme Risk Minimization  
Environmental protection was initially focused on what we now 
call ―visible pollution‖ and its immediate public health and aesthetic 
impacts.
121
 However, by the early 1970s, growing fears that exposure 
to a wide range of ordinary chemicals increased the risk of cancer 
helped to shift the focus of the public health branch of environmental 
protection to the regulation of toxic chemicals.
122
 Initially, cancer fear 
was driven by the mounting evidence about exposure to radiation. 
Then, Rachel Carson‘s famous book, The Silent Spring, alerted 
people to the unseen dangers of chemical compounds such as 
pesticides and helped undermine the dominant idea that science and 
technology produced only progress.
123
 As Stewart Udall wrote in The 
Quiet Crisis and the Next Generation, Rachel Carson ―wanted an 
―ecology for man‖ to counterbalance the excesses of Atomic Age 
arrogance.‖124 In the 1970s, more and more substances, including 
pepper and hair dryers, were identified as potential carcinogens and 
toxic substance regulation became a discrete environmental 
problem.
125
 As many of the articles in this symposium illustrate, toxic 
substance regulation helped to propel environmental law from 
remedying problems where the casual relation between the activity 
and the resulting damage was relatively clear, to the maddeningly 
complex world of risk assessment and management.
126
 
The rise of risk as a basis for regulation is the product of the 
successful efforts to ban the use of DDT. Silent Spring triggered 
lawsuits against the registration of the pesticide DDT and eventually 
a federal administration proceeding to ban the use of DDT.
127
 After 
two years of hearings, the hearing examiner found no conclusive 
proof of either ecological or public health damage, because the hard 
evidence that DDT caused immediate damage to humans or even to 
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the environment was too speculative.
128
 However, the new 
administrator of the federal Environmental Protection Agency, 
William Ruckelshaus, decided that it was politically and morally 
wrong to demand such a high level of proof in light of cancer and 
environmental risks, however contested, that the hearings revealed.
129
 
He made the decision to cancel the right to use DDT based on the 
future public health and environmental risks that it presented;
130
 this 
decision is the American root of the precautionary principle. 
Ruckelshaus‘s decision helped to undermine the idea that it was 
possible to determine safe and unsafe dose and exposure levels, and it 
led to the aggressive use of risk assessment as basis for regulation.
131
 
But, it also helped to produce the gridlock of much of toxic 
regulation because it set the stage for the good versus bad science 
debate and for risk management decisions that trade present benefits 
against remote risks.
132
 In his book, Cancer Wars, Robert Proctor 
distinguished between two types of conservatism in risk assessment 
debates.
133
 Public health conservatism was the environmental 
movement's response to the problem of scientific uncertainty. 
Chemicals that are suspected of causing serious adverse health effects 
but whose casual links cannot be clearly established by the existing 
state of knowledge can be regulated using a precautionary 
approach.
134
 Precaution that allowed the regulator to err 
―conservatively‖ on the side of safety was proposed and ultimately 
legitimated by the courts.
135
  
The substitution of risk for cause-in-fact is one of few seminal 
legal contributions of environmentalism, which has no roots in the 
common law or public law. However, we have never developed the 
institutions and legal standards to deal with the scientific uncertainty 
that pervades all toxic substances regulation.
136
 The purported 
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objectivity of science has been deconstructed by advocates of both 
more and less regulation. However, appeals for either more 
precautionary and more transparent regulation or a rule of reason 
have fallen on deaf ears. Instead of risk regulation reform, precaution 
fueled a powerful counter-reaction. Advocates of the conservative 
use of ―good science‖ labeled most risk assessment ―junk science‖ 
because it over-protected society.
137
 Regulators were unable to 
determine if a safe threshold existed, so they based reduction levels 
on what was technologically feasible rather than on a quantified risk 
assessment.
138
 Since the risks that regulators identify are low 
probability but serious risks—cancer or genetic mutation—the 
suspicion remains that we are over-protecting, although there are 
vigorous debates about the costs and benefits of risk reduction.
139
  
The question for the future is how law will react to sweeping 
changes in science. Cancer theory is moving toward extremely 
complex genetic explanations for the disease.
140
 This leads to 
increased reservations about the reliance on animal bioassays and the 
linear no-threshold models as well as the baselines that we choose to 
define risks.
141
 Two probing articles in this symposium help us 
grapple with these questions. Professor David Markell‘s article, An 
Overview of TSCA, its History and Key Underlying Assumptions, and 
its Place in Environmental Regulation, examines the major fruit of 
the concern over the adverse public health impacts of toxic 
chemicals,
142
 and Professor David E. Adelman‘s article, A Cautiously 
Pessimistic Appraisal of Trends in Toxics Regulation, carries the 
story forward and clearly explains why the existing regulatory 
structure does not work and why advances in science increase rather 
than decrease uncertainty.
143
  
 
 137. See, e.g., Special Report: Reform of Risk Regulation: Achieving More Protection at 
Less Cost, Report of the Harvard Group on Risk Management Reform, 1 HUMAN & 
ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 183 (1995). 
 138. See Markell, supra note 125, at 345–46. 
 139. See id. at 333 n.2. 
 140. See Adelman, supra note 54, at 411–26. 
 141. See id. at 409. 
 142. Markell, supra note 125.  
 143. Adelman, supra note 54.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Introduction 29 
 
 
Professor Markell‘s article traces how the growing concern that 
increased cancer rates were a function of environmental factors led to 
TSCA.
144
 In contrast to the after-the-fact approach of the earlier 
environmental statutes, Congress opted for a preventative, holistic 
approach to regulating these ―unknown‖ substances.145 Congress was 
acutely aware of the nation‘s lack of knowledge about health 
consequences of new chemicals coming on the market and of the 
need to develop the necessary data base.
146
 TSCA gave the EPA a 
herculean task, and the problems of realizing its promise were known 
from the start. Professor Markell summarizes the various studies and 
government reports and concludes that EPA has made little progress 
reviewing the some 80,000 chemicals subject to its jurisdiction.
147
 
EPA has tried to increase its regulatory efficiency by using its 
authority to require pre-market notification (―PMN‖) rather than 
testing; this allows the agency, in theory, to do a relatively rapid 
review of a substance.
148
  
Professor Adelman‘s article continues the story and shows that the 
decision to drop pre-market testing from TSCA in favor of pre-
manufacture notice, like Puccini‘s Tosca, does not have a happy 
ending.
149
 Professor Adelman argues that advances in the science of 
toxic regulation, especially toxicogenenomic models, will not lead to 
better toxic regulation.
150
 These new models may ―shift the focus of 
testing from animal models to in vitro testing of changes in specific 
biological processes using isolated cells.‖151 For example, the causal 
connections between any one gene and a complex disease are 
weak.
152
 Proposed reforms such as tiered regulatory review, enhanced 
post-market monitoring, and the promotion of green chemistry all 
have some potential to improve toxics regulation but none will deal 
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with the scientific, economic, and moral problems that lie at the heart 
of toxic regulation.
153
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Environmentalism and environmental law are ultimately about the 
relationship between humans and the earth. Environmental history is, 
in the words of Simon Schama, a tale ―of land taken, exploited, 
exhausted.‖154 Environmentalism and environmental law set out to 
substitute a new relationship for the historically abusive one. The late 
geographer Gilbert White traced the history of the relation of our 
changing perceptions of the earth from a storehouse of treasures or a 
subject of academic study to the present.
155
 He argued that we were 
moving away from the narrow environmental idea that the earth 
should be protected from threatens to human and natural well-being. 
―[People now] recognize a commitment to care for it in perpetuity 
. . . . To come to terms with problems posed by growth in numbers 
and appetites. . . . The roots are in a growing solemn sense of the 
individual as part of one human family for whom earth is its one 
spiritual home.‖156 
The articles in this symposium show that while large numbers of 
people have adopted White‘s optimistic environmental imperative, 
United States environmental law remains locked in the transition 
phase of protecting the earth from discrete threats to human and 
natural well-being. We are still groping for, in Professor Buzbee‘s 
words, ―a more stable and knowable regulatory environment.‖157 We 
need to build on the legacy of the first generation of environmental 
law by adapting it to new conditions. The major themes running 
through this symposium are that we require a richer theory of the 
appropriate scale and mix of government participants (monitored by 
NGOs), management strategies that use information both to set 
protection targets and to allow flexible ways of reaching them, and 
 
 153. Id. at 430–42. 
 154. SIMON SCHAMA, LANDSCAPE AND MEMORY 13 (1995).  
 155. Gilbert F. White, Reflections on Changing Perceptions of the Earth, 19 ANN. REV. 
ENERGY & ENV‘T 1 (1995).  
 156. Id. at 9. 
 157. See Buzbee, supra note 65, at 36. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  Introduction 31 
 
 
ways of reducing the stream of chemicals that impair public health 
even as the question of what triggers adverse impacts on the human 
body becomes ever more complex. As if these challenges are not 
enough, as we address issues such as biodiversity conservation, 
energy consumption, and global climate change, the question of how 
to effectively modify individual resource consumption and use will 
become a critical component of any holistic response strategy.
158
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